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POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
A RESPONSE TO PROF. F VENTER (PU vir CHO) 
  
KARUN D CHETTY  
(Durban Institute of Technology)  
  
1 INTRODUCTION  
  
In order to respond appropriately to Prof Venter’s paper on politics and constitutional 
adjudication I have already had sight of it. My comments therefore may be seen not 
only as a response but a reaction as well, to some of the opinions expressed by the 
Constitutional Court judges in the judgements cited therein.  
  
Prof Venter posits certain considerations of how judicial officers should deal with 
personal convictions when required to adjudicate in matters that have political 
implications; these are:  
  
Not to be politically motivated when producing judgements in cases having political 
consequences  
  
That since this would require great effort and since it may well be impossible for a 
judge to divorce her/himself from ingrained predispositions and premises, a solution 
may be found in standards of justice with which decisions must comply rather than a 
preoccupation of what goes on in the mind of a judge.  
  
I believe that there is more to it than in just attempting to establish standards of 
justice which in any event would be established by judges themselves.  
 
2  THE JUDICIARY AND A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY  
  
Perhaps the applications for the recusal of the judges in the SARFU and the 
SACCAWU cases may be attributed to perceptions of a crisis of legitimacy of the 
judiciary 
 Chaskalson CJ refers to an “evil and immoral” old order – a reference to the 
pre-constitutional era of apartheid. It was an era in which the judiciary was 
subordinate and subservient to parliamentary sovereignty; the law courts were 
undermined by successive governments that used them 'as instruments of 
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domination to work injustice, thus creating a crisis of legitimacy in the legal system 
as a whole.'
1
  
  
When recourse is had to the legal tradition of this country, it is generally accepted 
that parliamentary sovereignty as applied by the apartheid government had a 
deleterious and stifling effect on the judiciary and judicial activism. Judicial 
independence and the growth of judicial activism were compromised by the 
'inarticulate premises' of judges
2
 who either consciously or unconsciously articulated 
these premises in support of a minority government predicated on parliamentary 
supremacy and sovereignty as well as legal positivism that was 'invoked as a 
jurisprudential creed supportive of this approach'.
3
 Parliamentary sovereignty and its 
cognate, legal positivism, did not nurture a culture of judicial activism and legal 
realism but rather one that typified a sterile and impotent judiciary.
4
      
  
The apartheid regime engendered and fostered a legal system that was identified 
with a legitimacy crisis and complemented by a 'judiciary (that was) not only believed 
to be hardly representative of the population of South Africa, but to be out of touch 
with popular needs and notions of justice.'
5
 The predilections of judges coupled with 
the notion of the ‘inarticulate premises’ was perceived as perpetuating not only the 
concept of parliamentary supremacy but worse still a minority white hegemony 
predicated on racism. ‘The legal order of apartheid [had] brought not only white 
South Africa into disrepute. It [had] undermined faith and confidence in the whole 
South African legal system.’
6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1    L du Plessis & H Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 1994 at 191.  
2    J Dugard  Human Rights and the South African Legal Order  1978  374-382.  
3    Op cit at 82.  
4    George N Barrie ‘The Challenge of the South African Judiciary in the 1990's’ (1989) 4 TSAR  515  at 516.   
KD Chetty  PER/PELJ 2003(6)2 
13/173 
 
  
3  Judicial Revisionism   
  
What then is required to reinstate an impartial judiciary that Cameron AJ (as he was 
then) opines is more easily attainable than a “colourless neutrality”?  
  
The new constitution heralds a new legal order in South Africa.  It brings with it not 
only a new philosophy of constitutionalism but also the potential for a new 
constitutional jurisprudence.  
  
The Constitution invests the courts with the power and function of judicial review
7
 
which necessitates that all law be examined against the standard of values that are 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights and where the law is inconsistent with these norms 
and values, the courts must declare it either in whole or in part constitutionally 
invalid.  
  
Despite the criticisms levelled against it, the judiciary does possess the necessary 
skills, experience and intellectual capacity to interpret a Bill of Rights. Given that a 
cataclysmic transformation of the judiciary is neither practical nor desirable, what is 
required though to alter the mind-set of parochial and conservative-minded judges is 
a concerted judicial revisionism that would activate judicial thinking and constitutional 
jurisprudential development. Although it is anticipated that there will be a cautious, 
narrow approach by the courts in accordance with conservative activism, judicial 
revisionism must transform the judiciary’s intellectual and attitudinal inclinations to 
manifest creativity, tact, imagination and sensitivity in the interpretation and 
application not only of the Bill of Rights but the Constitution as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5    Johan van der Westhuizen ‘The Protection of Human Rights and a Constitutional Court for South Africa:   
     Some Questions and Ideas, with reference to the German Experience’ (1991)  De Jure 1 at 2. 
6    Du Plessis And Others v De Klerk And Another 1996 (3) SA 850  at 401.  
7    Chapter 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996, Act 108 of 1996.  
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To re-instate the confidence of the public in the impartiality, neutrality and 
independence of the judiciary, judges will be required to develop a judicial framework 
and policy that will produce a constitutional jurisprudence for the reconstruction of 
society.  
  
And to achieve this the judiciary needs to transform itself by actively engaging in a 
process of judicial revisionism and activism so that judges may be seen to discharge 
their function without fear, favour or prejudice in a democratic constitutionalism the 
foundations of which are human dignity, equality and freedom. After all the 
Constitution should ‘permeate all that judges do’.    
  
The judgements in the Sarfu and Saccawu cases were good judgements for to have 
ruled otherwise would have exacerbated the crisis of legitimacy.  
  
